The Prabowo Subianto government is currently drafting a piece of legislation to counter disinformation and foreign propaganda amid allegations that hostile domestic and foreign actors are using cyberspace to undermine Indonesia’s national interests.

An academic memorandum outlining the rationale for such legislation (an important first step in the legislative process) has been circulating among journalists and activists. This has raised speculation that the government plans to speed up the handling of the bill. After all, Coordinating Law, Human Rights, Immigration, and Correctional Services Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra told the media that the initiative to create the bill came directly from President Prabowo himself.

This is concerning because while the government asserts that the proposed bill will comply with human rights principles, as outlined in the academic memorandum, human rights groups are not convinced.

The big question is, as Indonesia faces creeping autocratisation under the Prabowo government, will the bill do more harm than good to its democracy?

Why the government needs this legislation

The 67-page-long academic memorandum released by the Law Ministry, argues that Indonesia ‘lacks a comprehensive and integrated legal instrument to prevent, detect, and counter disinformation and foreign propaganda that also guarantees human rights.’  Indonesia, it says, is particularly ‘vulnerable’ to such threats, given the country’s high internet penetration and low digital literacy.

The document states that special legislation is needed to provide legal certainty in the fight against foreign propaganda that threatens ‘national information sovereignty’, divides the nation, compromises democracy, and weakens national resilience. The current legal framework, it argues, is not comprehensive enough to address the challenges of global information warfare, where foreign influence operations are ‘powered by social media, artificial intelligence, and transnational networks’ of malicious actors.

In fact, Indonesia already has at least three laws to combat disinformation and foreign propaganda: the 2024 Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) Law, the 2002 Broadcast Law and the 1999 Press Law.

The memorandum says, however, that the ITE Law does not regulate mechanisms for identifying and addressing ‘influence operations’ conducted outside Indonesia’s jurisdiction. The Broadcast Law, it says, is still caught up in the pre-digital era, while the Press Law was not designed to protect national interests because it does not position the press as a ‘strategic partner’ of the government.

While the document makes some compelling arguments for such legislation, it leaves many questions unanswered. We cannot debate the details of the proposed bill because it hasn’t yet been drafted,  but many concerns have been raised over the true motive for the decision to create it.

State propaganda and Prabowo’s anti-foreign rhetoric

The reality is that cyberspace — as a new public sphere or, in Gramscian sense, a new arena of conflicts among competing social forces — is more than just a tool for foreign powers to influence political narratives in Indonesia. In reality, the state itself could be the party organising disinformation campaigns against its own people.

Several studies have shown that oligarchic powers with direct or indirect control over state institutions, regularly engage in disinformation campaigns to protect or advance their interests. This is usually visible when the government’s unpopular policies are met with strong public criticism. One example is the government’s passage of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation in 2020, which triggered massive protests offline and online.

But perhaps the most sinister aspect of the legislative proposal is its timing. It came as Prabowo once again whipped up fears of ‘foreign intervention’ destabilising Indonesia. He has consistently asked the public to ‘exercise caution’ regarding ‘foreign efforts to divide the country.’ In his official public address following massive nationwide protests in late August 2025, Prabowo insinuated that the protests  were ‘backed’ by foreign powers ‘that did not want to see Indonesia thrive.’ A fragment of his speech, ‘Hai, antek-antek asing (Hey, foreign lackeys)’, has become a meme on Indonesian social media.

It is unclear whether the government will push for the bill’s enactment this year, given Prabowo’s endorsement. If so, it would face major hurdles. The government and national legislature (DPR and DPD RI) finalised their 2025-2029 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) last September. The proposed bill is not among the 67 RUU prioritas (priority bills)  to be discussed in 2026, nor is it included in the list of 198 bills to be discussed before 2029. However, if enough political pressure was applied by the palace, the bill could still ‘jump the queue’ in the DPR.

Is an even colder winter coming for journalists, NGOs and diaspora activists?

For now, the critical question for civil society groups is: if the bill is passed into law, who will be its targets? If the academic memorandum is any indication of what the actual draft bill might look like, there are three groups that could be in trouble.

First, Indonesian-based media and NGOs that are funded by, or receive grants from, foreign donors. For instance, the academic manuscript’s support for ‘foreign capital restrictions’ on Indonesian media as stipulated by the Broadcasting Law (32/2002) indicates the government’s suspicion of Indonesian media outlets that receive foreign grants, which it sees as delegitimising their journalistic products.

Just last year, Indonesia’s leading investigative media, Tempo, was accused of being an ‘antek asing’ for receiving a media grant from MDIF (Media Development Investment Fund), an initiative associated with George Soros. Thus, within the same logic on foreign funding, international organisations with interest in and operating in Indonesia are second potential target.

Similar authoritarian tactics have been used to suppress the media in the Philippines. During President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration—which also heavily leveraged anti-foreign narratives, particularly against the United States—several independent media outlets critical of the government, including Rappler and Vera Files, were accused of receiving foreign funding.

Third, the academic memorandum suggests that future legislation may target the Indonesian diaspora and their allies abroad who are critical of the government. In its literature review (Chapter 2, p. 24), the memorandum considers the principles of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ nationality. It states that these principles are the same ones found in criminal law and public international law that determine the scope of application of a country’s laws to legal subjects and actions with a cross-border element.

In this case, by adhering to the ‘active nationality’ principle, the Indonesian government could legitimately prosecute members of the Indonesian diaspora who use the privilege of being located outside Indonesia to exert international pressure through their local demonstrations abroad. Using this principle, the Indonesian government could technically extend its legal jurisdiction to Indonesians anywhere in the world.

The memorandum claims that the bill will focus on ‘prevention and mitigation’ and ‘platform governance’, and that criminal prosecution would be a last resort. But this means little as long as the law enforcement institutions remain far from independent.

For the Indonesian diaspora and activists, this legislative proposal feels like the government is sending them a clear and chilling threat: no ocean is too wide, no country too far.

Credit News: www.indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/